We carry in our heads and hearts, basic notions about how to plan for effective strategies that makes best use of the evidence collected regarding any field of professional practice. Some of these “models,” or “strategies,” are rather simpleminded, such as those based on carrot and stick assumptions: make use of the evidence to formulate the best possible practice and then threaten to take away some source of security or status, or promise to provide more of what the target of your change efforts wants. Some are more elaborate. Basically, however, four very different assumptions about what leads people or organizations to embrace and make use of the evidence collected regarding any professional practice are represented by four rather different change strategies. They are the Rational Planning, Human Problem-Solving, Social Interaction and Political approaches.
The first three emerge from the seminal scholarship of Ronald Havelock and his associates many years ago at the University of Michigan’s Center for Research on the Utilization of Scientific Knowledge. They observed that all utilization strategies emphasize one of three particular aspects of the basic communication act: I create a message which I deliver in such a way that the receiver (myself, someone else or a whole organization) accepts it and acts on it. One set of strategies, which Havelock called Research, Development and Diffusion (R&D), and which I call Rational Planning, concentrates mainly on developing a terrific message. A second set, called Problem-Solving by Havelock, focuses upon how the receiver comes to feel the need for and then the willingness to accept the evidence. The third set, called Social Interaction or Communication of Innovations, has been offered by Everett Rogers and other Diffusion of Innovation researchers. It emphasizes the process and factors by which the evidence gains the attention and acceptance of the receiver and focuses on the social act of communicating new notions. The fourth set, Political, was added to the list by my colleague. Jack Lindquist (1978). This set dwells on this same part of the communication act as the Problem-Solving model, but with quite different assumptions about how to generate change.
Havelock and later theorists see effective improvement of professional practices as a combination of these four approaches. But the separate models are well worth elaborating, for they represent strong differences in the ways evidence is treated. I will briefly describe each of the first three and then spend a bit more time on the fourth approach (which is usually of particular value to those seeking to influence a specific professional practice).
THE RATIONAL APPROACH
This approach is based on assumptions regarding rationality which lead to heavy investment in basic and applied research and to considerable investment in the formulation, testing and packaging of innovations based on research. This is the approach that seems to underlie most of the current attempts to use evidence in the attempt to improve professional practices—at least during the early stages of the improvement process. Havelock identifies five basic assumptions which underlie the Research and Development strategy. First, the R&D model suggests that dissemination and utilization should be a rational sequence of activities which moves from research to development to packaging before dissemination takes place. Second, this model assumes that there has to be planning, and planning on a massive scale. It is not enough that we simply have all these activities of research and development; they have to be coordinated; there has to be a relationship between them; and they have to make sense in a logical sequence that may go back years in the evolution of one particular message to be disseminated.
Third, there has to be a division of labor and a separation of roles and functions, an obvious prerequisite in all complex activities of modern society, but one that we sometimes ignore. Fourth, it assumes a more or less clearly defined target audience, a specified passive consumer, who will accept the innovation if it is delivered on the right channel, in the right way, and at the right time. Extensive scientific evaluation is needed to assure that this happens. Evaluation is to occur at every stage of development and dissemination. Fifth, this perspective accepts the fact of high initial development cost prior to any dissemination activity, because it anticipates an even higher gain in the long run—in terms of efficiency, quality, and capacity to reach a mass audiences. We can see around us plenty of examples of the rational change model. Cars and planes and other material “products” are made and sold that way. Many federal government agencies have employed rational assumptions in supporting the research and development of various programs ranging from agriculture to education, and from Internet technology to defense. Evidence-based medicine and psychotherapy would seem to have been founded on this set of assumptions.
Professional practice improvement is often supported by encouraging individual practitioners, professional associations or government agencies to formulate proposals based on the best reason and evidence available. Review bodies, whether based in governance or professional certification bodies, then judge these proposals and the underlying evidence and decide for or against ostensibly on the basis of rational considerations. Although we (and the behavioral economists) know all too well that good reason and sound evidence are not the only grounds on which decisions are made, the formal system, the one that serves as a foundation for the professionalization of a specific field, stresses the rational model. We formally act as if we all approach improvement of professional practice rationally. This is particularly the case in newly emerging professional practices—that embrace a culture of what Parsons calls “cognitive rationality.” The leaders of these professional fields find it hard to admit other approaches.
Certainly, there should be participation by those whose attitudes and behaviors are aligned with the rational model, but this should not be the sole source of building a case for specific professional practices in coaching or any other field. Research conducted over many years has found the rational model inadequate in several respects as a way to go about the introduction of change in human attitudes and behaviors. In the main, criticism has focused on the isolation of R&D from its audience—the stakeholders, the people who supposedly are going to use these new fangled ideas or behaviors as providers or clients. Rational systems may be good ways to research and develop new ideas regarding professional practices, but they do not explain all the motivations and activities by which specific professional practices get used by either the providers or recipients.
The dynamics of local implementation are especially critical to the actual use of evidence. Individuals and institutions do not operate simply as rational systems thoughtfully accepting orthodox practices–let alone buying the latest innovations. If evidence and the recommendations based on evidence threaten individual or institutional security and status, it is in trouble no matter how elegant its reason. Informal systems of communications and social status may be far more potent than formal communications in persuading providers and recipients of professional practices whether or not to embrace a specific practice. Certainly reason and evidence are part of the improvement equation. You will not get very far off lousy evidence and flimsy reason. But an adequate strategy for ensuring that evidence in a field such as professional coaching must include much more than clear and compelling reason.
THE RESOLUTION OF HUMAN PROBLEMS APPROACH
Parsons and Platt (1973) noted many years ago that the acceptance of evidence and institutionalization of a change is imbedded in the non rational layers of motivation among the people potentially impacted by the change initiative. Their insights seem to still be valid—as portrayed in the work of many contemporary behavioral economists (e.g. Ariely, 2008; Kahneman,2011).Change will not occur simply through the presentation of rational arguments regarding the advantages of this change. People are not the issue—rather it is the need of these people for dependency or autonomy that is the issue. Or it is the intensity of anxiety experienced by these people as they face the challenge of change. There is, in short, a psychological dimension to change to which the Rational approach does not do justice. Rational planning does form part of the equation, but underlying interests, habits, fears and prejudices compose the bulk of the iceberg. We often pretend that the essential aspects of planned change are out in the open, in our plans and public discussions. We know better. And if we seek a strategy for intentional change which will actually work, then we need to get at these hidden sources of resistance. Human Problem-Solving approaches offer some assistance.
The general strategy is familiar enough to most people: the review of evidence and acceptance of change is a process of solving problems. Something is not going right, so we diagnose the problem, set some objectives, find a solution, make a decision, implement it and evaluate its worth. Simple. It really is the Rational approach—but not if the problem is my need to have control, your fear of a change which may endanger your security, or our general distrust of one another. Then, say advocates of Human Problem-Solving strategies, we need skillful interventions. We need someone or some process which can help us confront and reduce these hidden obstacles to change. Intervention may come in the form of leadership training. It may involve building an effective problem-solving team. It may focus on the department or on the relationship of the whole organization to its environment. Some intervention tactics, such as organization development or appreciative inquiry are quite psychological in their focus. Others, such as various survey feedback interventions, are more sociological. But all aim to help us deal with the human resistances to change which we may otherwise avoid.
The Human Relations School of business administration, from Elton Mayo and Chester Barnard in the thirties to Rensis Likert and Chris Argyris in the second half of the 20th Century, to the appreciative inquiry movement and many organizational coaching strategies in the 2lst Century, has used this strategy extensively in efforts to improve the functioning of businesses and industry. In his synthesis of the literature in this field, Havelock identifies five basic tenets of this approach. First, the user world (the, person who is to adopt a new idea or practice) is the only sensible place from which to begin to consider utilization. Second, knowledge utilization must include a diagnostic phase where user need is considered and translated into a problem statement. Third, the role of the outsider is primarily to serve as catalyst, collaborator, or consultant on how to plan change and bring about the solution. Fourth, internal knowledge retrieval and the marshalling of internal resource should be given at least equal emphasis with external retrieval. Finally, self-initiation by the user or client system creates the best motivational climate for lasting change.
There frequently also is an assumption that collaboration and openness rather than competition and closedness are preferred ways to behavior. In keeping with the founding values of this approach (articulated by Kurt Lewin) consensus is sought over majority rule or authoritative decree. Those who must carry out the charge need to own it as their solution to their concerns. Trust between the persons attempting change and the people who are to be changed is deemed crucial to genuine change. In all these assumptions, you can see the influence of humanistic psychology. Essentially, applied behavioral science takes a clinical model and applies it to groups and organizations.
This strategy for change has been far more controversial in many organizations over the past four decades than R&D or Social Interaction, if for no other reason than that it probes sources of resistance we prefer to leave buried. Also, because it focuses at least part of its attention on our emotional needs, it conflicts with the assumption of “cognitive rationality” that Parsons and Platt claim is so prevalent in many contemporary societies. We would like to think we are “above all that.” Even if we are rather irrational at times, we dare not admit it. Do bankers admit they sometimes lose things? Are banks not only too big to fail but also too important to appear irrational? There is little space for the recognition of irrationality in a world that is not flat and information-based—as Thomas Friedman (2007, 2008) proposed—but curved and dangerous—as David Smick (2008) counter-proposed. Still, applied behavioral science has been with us for over a half century. If Parsons and Platt (and the behavioral economists) are right, we will not get very far toward effective strategies for change unless we face the human barriers to change which human problem-solving interventions confront.
THE POLITICAL APPROACH
If we follow the Rational model, the route to influence and change is to build and argue an impressive case. The Social strategy takes that case, puts it on terms attractive to its audience, personally introduces it to Innovators and Opinion Leaders. It then communicates through them to their various reference groups. The Human Problem-Solving path releases the resistance to change within us and makes change our solution to our concerns. All well and good. There is much to learn from the experts in these two general schools of thought. But what if our “enemies” block the road, blind to our eloquent presentations and determined to let no “touchy-feely” intervention (such as coaching) get into their locked closet of fears, prejudices and selfish desires? Not a few upper level managers, corporate executives and blue ribbon task forces have been characterized as such obstructionists by those who want to turn their heads in a new direction.
The most common answer is political power. Build coalitions among influential persons and groups. Then seek an authoritative decision which requires others to comply with the new idea, employ the new behavior, or use the innovative product. Here is the way political processes usually work. First, some range of gnawing concerns (some “wants”) arises. Things are not as they should be for some persons in a community. Unless these various wants are felt strongly by influential people, and the people who hold them bring together various subgroups, no change is likely. People are usually upset about something or other but not sufficiently so to press authorities into a decision. But if the gap, if the discontent, is great enough a “demand” may well be in the offing. Then, if those concerned feel they can make authorities take notice and have confidence that a more desirable state of affairs is possible, they take action.
Once a demand is made, it must gain access to the formal decision-making system if it is to become a change in policy or program. Key here is a sympathetic “gate-keeper,” a person or group who can put the demand on the authorities’ agenda. Without a supportive gatekeeper, demanders must be powerful enough to break the gate down and be willing to take that risk. Committee and task-force chairpersons and upper level managers and members of the C-suite can play gate-keeping roles concerning demands for policy change. Once on the agenda, the demand gets deliberated. It is studied and debated, often modified or changed, usually by an executive or some committee. If it survives this buffeting, it emerges as a formulated proposal for change which then gets reviewed, modified, revised, reduced and in general worked over by all the persons or groups concerned about its potential impact on their vested interests.
Will this new program, product or process (such as coaching) gain our department more attention, more autonomy, more status, more funding? Or is this program, product or process likely to have the opposite impact? Is it likely to attract more believers and customers or are we likely to create disbelievers and lose customers? Usually, coalitions of interest will form pro and con. Compromises are made to get some decision through. Much of the debate may focus on the proposal’s soundness of reason and evidence, but savvy observers know that the issue is who gets what coveted “goodies.” Important to the survival of change proposals in this river of nibbling piranhas are the persistent efforts of highly influential “issue sponsors” who are determined to carry the change through. Without such determined advocates, the status quo powers will defeat any change attempt.
In most organizations, change proposals can take the short route if the demander is a president or CEO who goes ahead and exercises formal authority to set policy or it may take the long route by moving up the hierarchy or through layer upon layer of committees. In either case, the outcome is not yet change. It is an authoritative decision to change. Now emerges the problem of making it stick. Usually, an executive instructs organizational units and individuals to carry out the new idea or behavior. Unfortunately (or fortunately) the Political model breaks down in implementation unless that executive can force units and individuals to comply, identify whether or not they are complying, and get rid of non-compliants. The formal authorities turn out not to be the real authorities. Departments and employees (accountants, engineers, information technologists, etc.) in many contemporary organizations have considerable autonomy—illustrated brilliantly in the “Dilbert” cartoons of Scott Adams. If these autonomous “experts” do not like a new policy or program, they often can avoid serious implementation and, meanwhile, build a new coalition to get the policy rescinded or program dropped. The process is not one of open collaboration seeking consensus. It is instead a constant struggle for control. Losers of today’s battles do not give up. They mount a new demand.
If vested interests and power were everything involved in planned change, an effective political strategy would be all one would need. But reason and evidence are sometimes heeded even by those whose vested interests are somewhat challenged and who have the power to ignore rational persuasion. Social dynamics are at work, and the more the change agent knows about how to make them work, the better. Often, it is more effective to seek to reduce resistance to change by human relations strategies than to try to overwhelm that resistance by force. If motivation researchers are correct that we all have the need for achievement and affiliation, as well as for power, then we need a change strategy which speaks to all three motivations, not just to power.
THE SOCIAL INTERACTION APPROACH
We live in social networks. One network may connect us to professional colleagues; another unites us with family and friends. Through these connections we get news and views about what’s happening in the world around us. We can gain security, status and esteem from these informal systems, just as we can from formal organizations. Some researchers maintain that these contacts are essential to change, for new ideas get communicated and validated through social networks; Everett Rogers is most frequently identified with this school of thought. Agricultural Extension agencies are the change agent units which best represent this approach in contrast with research and development centers. We also find this approach being used by many wise and experienced communication consultants. It should be in the tool kit used by anyone seeking to change an organization—or install an evidence-based coaching program.
Everett Rogers (along with his Diffusion of Innovation colleagues) find that most empirical studies of innovation identify a few consistent types of “potential adopters” and a few specific stages in the adoption of new ideas, practices or objects. In every organization or community, there will be a few Innovators, eager to try new things and usually uncomfortable with the status quo (which in turn is uncomfortable with them). These have also been called by Sally Kuhlenschmidt (2010), the “explorers” who boldly go where no one else has gone before (to borrow from the intro to “Star Trek”) and map out the newly discovered territory. They are the innovative thought-leaders and daring practice-leaders in organizations.
A second group, somewhat larger than the first but still rarely more than twelve to fifteen percent of the outfit, is labeled the Early Adopters. They usually are quite cosmopolitan in contacts and open to new ideas, though not as eager as the Innovators. Keeping with Kuhlenschmidt’s metaphor, these are the pioneers who “venture West” after the explorers map out the territory. These men and women are willing to try out any new idea—at least as a pilot test—often because in other areas they are themselves the innovators.
Following in sequence of adoption is the Early Majority, making up perhaps a third of the population; these are the cautious followers of the Earlier Adopters. These are the settlers in the new territory. They want some proof or at least some stability before making a commitment. How do I know that this product will work? Can you assure me that this service will be effective and of value to me? Do we have any evidence that coaching really works?
Another third then comes along—the skeptical Late Majority—which wants overwhelming evidence that this new practice is possible, effective and rewarded before it ventures a try. We would suggest that these are the burghers, who only move into a town or city after it is formally established. The “band-wagon” effect is often evident—as is Malcolm Gladwell’s (2000) “tipping point”. Employees will embrace the new product and engage the new services only after they see most other people around them already committed.
Finally, about fifteen percent of most systems will be made up of Laggards, who probably will resist change until everyone else is already doing the next new thing. These are the people who never move or move only after they are forced to do so (because of deteriorating financial conditions, political exile or related external pressures). In some cases, the laggards are the former innovators who got “burned out” by the failure of others to accept their plan. They now view other innovators as threatening to their own self-esteem: “If I can’t do it, I certainly don’t want anyone else to do it!”
Each successive group needs substantially stronger persuasion in order to change or at least accept a new program, product or process (such as coaching). While change messages delivered through impersonal channels (books, articles, formal addresses, Internet essays, or written proposals) can persuade Innovators and Early Adopters, as well as increase awareness generally, later adopters need more personal communication and contact in order to be willing to change. Although it can take a short time for a change to move from one category of adopters to another (especially since the world became “flat”), several years is more common for new behaviors to be firmly established and several decades for new major ideas and perspectives to be anchored in a society. Clearly, the change advocate who thinks she can gain acceptance and use of new human behaviors or ideas by impersonal communication over a short period of time to a whole organization is in for bitter disappointment unless the group can be coerced and carefully controlled—and this is rarely the case today (at least in most technologically-advanced and autonomy-oriented societies).
Innovation diffusion researchers find that the best route into an organization or community is through Opinion Leaders, those persons (or institutions) to whom others turn for advice. Hovland and Weiss noted many years ago that the most persuasive communicators are those whose expertise, experience, or social role establish them as credible sources of the information presented. Harvard has been an institutional opinion-leader on almost anything—as are Yale, Stanford, the University of California and many other major universities. Today, with the dominance of the Internet as a source of information, there is much less a centralization of opinion-leadership. If Freedman (2007, 2008) is right about the world becoming “flat” then opinion-leadership becomes diffuse and constantly changing (and often isolated and reinforced in small opinion enclaves). Smick’s (2008) curved world also seems viable (and quite dangerous) with regard to opinion-leadership.
Social interaction researchers also find that certain attributes of innovations besides impressive reason and evidence influence their adoption. Does the innovation have clear relative advantages for our particular situation, whether those advantages are better ability to meet institutional objectives, reduced costs, higher status or greater enjoyment? Is the innovation compatible with our values, our structure, our skills and styles? Is the innovation divisible so that we can adopt only the parts we like, or adopt in some easy sequence, rather than buying the whole change at once? Is the new thing simple to understand and do? Does it involve low risk and low uncertainty? Can we observe it and try it out so we know better what we are getting into? Whether it’s a consultant’s recommendation or an internally-generated proposal to modify a production process, these ingredients will be important. Yet it is difficult to assess the relative advantages of specific innovations. They often clash with traditional organization-wide values and structures. Often, a whole, complex proposal is laid on the leadership team at once, with little promise that it will reap positive rewards. And such proposals are usually paper descriptions, not visible experiences which members of the organization can see and try before accepting. It is small wonder that significant, planned change is such a rare occurrence in many organizations.
For the past three decades, this model of innovation diffusion has guided the thinking and perspectives of many people who are involved in change initiatives of all kinds (ranging from water purification systems to the distribution and use of contraceptive devices to the introduction of new digital technologies in a “flat world”). While popular with certain people, the diffusion of innovation model and research, ironically, has not itself diffused very successfully—until Malcolm Gladwell’s Tipping Point (Gladwell, 2000) was published (offering a somewhat condensed and some would say distorted version of Rogers’ diffusion model). I propose to do some diffusion of Rogers’ model (hopefully without major distortion) by applying it in a preliminary way to the challenge of making evidence more influential with regard to professional coaching. I will borrow extensively from Sally Kuhlenschmidt’s (2010) alternative terminology in offering my preliminary analysis.
The Innovators/Explorers
I would suggest that there are several kinds of innovators/explorers who either preceded or entered at critical moments in the early history of professional coaching (see Brock, 2014). Some of the preceding innovators were major thought-leaders of their era. Such visionaries as Thomas Leonard, Laura Whitworth and John Whitmore exemplify this explorer category in the field of professional coaching. A second cluster of innovators is composed of those who are the practice-leaders. They innovate not primarily with new ideas, but rather with new programs and new strategies. These are the people who establishing the first corporate coaching programs and those who built the first, thriving coaching practices. These innovators/explorers (whether thought leaders or practice leaders in any professional field) typically have made very little use of available evidence in forging into the wilderness. As the explorers they are making the maps rather than following the maps. Even if they have maps, they probably won’t use them because they don’t trust what is being provided and because (if they are candid) they would using prefer to strike out on their own as renegades and seekers of individual distinction and autonomy.
Early Adopters/Pioneers
As Kuhlenschmidt’s term suggests, these people are the ones who are willing to “venture West” after the explorers map out the territory. The Early Adopters are willing to embrace or at least try out a new idea – often because in other areas they have themselves been innovators. As a result of their own past experiences, these pioneers do not need much convincing. They will try out a new idea or procedure, find its faults, assist in its improvement, and tell the world that it has great potential. I think of my colleagues, Agnes Mura and John Lazar who both played a major role in founding the International Journal of Coaching in Organization (Lazar being the co-owner and publisher) and the International Consortium for Coaching in Organizations.
In many instances, the early adopters are the “make or break” folks. If they don’t support or try out the new idea, then no one else is likely to get on board the covered wagon (or train) as it “heads West.” There seem to be several different types of early adopters. First there are the funders. They pay for the wagon or train (and often the wagon master/facilitator). In coaching, they are often the corporate leaders who first make personal use of a coach or support pilot coaching programs in their own organization. While funding sources were very important during the early stages of any innovation, there was a second cluster of men and women who are invaluable in moving this innovation to early adoption. These are the sponsors. In coaching, we can look to organizations such as the Conference Board and the American Society for Training and Development (now called the Association for Talent Development).
Closely related to this second cluster are those women and men who actively promote the innovation. These promoters neither had the money (funders) nor the formal institution position of authority (sponsors) to bring about early adoption of faculty development. However, they were like Johnny Appleseed—moving across the land planting seeds. A third cluster of people who help move innovations to early adoption are those who bring order to the innovation and identify how best to administer these innovations. These are the early managers who take over from the often-disorganized innovators. Seymour Sarason (1972) identified the critical role played by these managers when describing the creation of new settings. The founders, first managers and early board members of the International Coaching Federation (ICF) come to mind.
Early Majority/Settlers
Members of the Early Majority are much more selective than the Early Adopters. They want some proof before making a commitment. How do I know that this product will work? Can you assure me that this service will be effective and of value to me? Do we have any evidence that this product or service is worth the money we will have to spend in order to bring it to market? In populating the American West, these are the settlers who wait until they know that there is something to settle into. They wait for reports from the pioneers and check to see if these reports are accurate. They look to the Lewis and Clarks to provide credible accounts of the “true” West. This is where evidence-based coaching finds it’s “sweet spot.”
What are the ingredients that make an innovation “respectable”? What evidence is credible? Four ingredients stand out: (1) building a base of research evidence and interdisciplinary scholarship that is diverse and broad-based, (2) constructing solid administrative support, (3) building upon newly-emerging institutional norms and values and (4) establishing a profession to guide the further development of the field. I will briefly comment on each of these ingredients. First, as Rodgers has noted, there has to be some compelling evidence of both a qualitative and quantitative nature that is based on reputable research. This research must to be complimented by solid scholarship that is based in several disciplines. This scholarship must, in turn, be both theoretically-sound and practical.
Second, an innovation is much more likely to be embraced by the Early Majority and is more likely to be sustained if it is well-managed. There is another element that is just as important: the program should be carefully and systematically crafted so that services are being provided in response to a diverse set of concerns and needs. Third, the acceptance of a new product or service is often predicated in part on the interplay of this innovation with newly-emerging norms and values in the organization. In the case of coaching, this might mean linking these initiatives to norms of sustainability, empowerment or entrepreneurship.
Fourth, the Early Majority often look to the establishment of a profession if they specifically are considering the acceptance of a new type of human service initiative. Many years ago, Bledstein (1976) proposed that the American society is deeply enmeshed in a culture of professionalism. By extension, other Western societies are also moving toward a culture in which professional credentials are replacing social-economic class structures as the defining criterion for social stratification. Organizations such as ICF, the Graduate School Alliance for Education in Coaching and the Association of Coaching Training Organizations are all helping to build a coaching profession.
Late Majority/Burghers
Kuhlenschmidt doesn’t offer a term for this fourth diffusion category, perhaps because we don’t have a readily accessible name for the people who move into a town or city after it is formally established. In Europe the term “burgher” was used to identify a person who resided in a formally chartered town. I will use this European term because I think it conveys the essence of Rogers’ Late Majority. These people only embrace an innovative idea after it has been fully certified and accepted as a legitimate idea or operation. In Western America, these are the folks who only move in when the town is “well-established”—with the requisite schools, paved roads, general store and church. Gladwell uses the term “tipping point” when describing this broad-based acceptance of an idea that has been legitimized. The term “band-wagon” is also appropriate in that the acceptance of a product or service by the Late Majority often means a substantial increase in the number of people using this product or service.
While the “band-wagon” phenomenon can initially be very gratifying to someone who has been laboring for many years to get a new product or service accepted, it can also create major problems—because this new product or service is typically not fully understood by the late majority and is often misused. This can lead to “casualties.” For instance, jogging may become an “in-thing”; however, Late Majority joggers are likely to injure themselves because they do not properly prepare for this new form of exercise. The band wagon can also lead to failure and anger: “why doesn’t this darn thing work”. Alternatively, uncritical Late Majority acceptance of a new product or service can lead to neglect or inefficiency. The newly-purchased desk-top computer, for instance, may either sit on the desk unused or be used only as a glorified typewriter or expensive play station.
In many cases we find burghers entering the scene when there is a stable source of funding. This often is a chicken-and-egg phenomenon. There is greater funding because more people are involved, and more people (Late Majority) are involved because there is greater funding. Given the financial instability found in many of our contemporary institutions, we may find a retreat in the funding of innovative programs and a subsequent retreat in the number of participants. The “burghers” may return to safer financial ground (the chartered town).
Several Late Majority-related strategies can be identified. We can suggest the use of surveys, focus groups, and advisory committees. In each of these instances, it is not so important that one make use of the data gathered from these initiatives; rather these research tools are engaged as marketing tools. Participants in the survey, focus group or advisory committee get the sense that they are not alone—other people are involved. Furthermore, since they are being asked for their opinion, this activity must be legitimate and main stream: if it was not legitimate then they wouldn’t be among those being asked. Psychologists have counseled us for many years that cognitive dissonance is created if people participate in something that they don’t value. Once they agree to participate, these men and women must support (at least minimally) the activity in order to restore cognitive equilibrium. An effective innovative program should target several populations, with different communication strategies being used for each of them. One of these populations can be the Late Majority and cognitive dissonance-based marketing can be an effective leverage point for this constituency. Web sites regarding the innovation can link interested parties to book reviews, institutional policies and timely information about events and resources (all of these being attractive to many in the Late Majority).
At a more fundamental level, a new innovation will become an accepted practice if it is associated with other traditions, values and activities that are already widely-accepted and respected by the Late Majority. A critical role is being played at an early stage in the life of any innovation by women and men who linked this innovation to established products and services. The field of coaching should now take advantage of its heritage by reminding people (late majority) that coaching has grown out of several well-established human service professions—such as career counseling, financial planning and pastoral counseling (including the Catholic confessional!)
Laggards/Stay-At-Homers
What about those folks who remain back home? They won’t move West under any conditions. They can’t be convinced, bribed or cajoled. In many instances, they are actively engaged in efforts to discourage the wide-spread adoption of an innovation. They might be silent at first; however, once the innovation begins to pick up steam and threatens to be accepted by the Early and Late Majority, they may become quite vocal.
In many instances, the objections of the Laggard (and the frequent misunderstanding of the Laggard) can be attributed to their differing perspective regarding the innovation. The Laggards often come from subcultures other than our own (as someone who labels them “laggard”). They view the new innovative program as representative of a subculture that is alien to the one they prefer. Managerial “fads” are illustrative. Critics and skeptics regarding professional coaching as a “fad” might be considered Laggards by those who are promoting coaching practices, and firmly believe it will not soon fade away. We can best address these sources of opposition through taking an appreciative approach—recognizing that these alternative perspectives are valuable and that a 21st Century institution needs all of these perspectives if it is to remain viable. The generative and dialogic tools of Appreciative Inquiry are appropriate, as are the tools of polarity management (which I will present when detailing plans for making effective use of evidence).
There is yet another source of Laggard opposition to a new product or service. Their objections, in many instances, don’t arise from the flaws and threats associated with the innovation—after all we all appear to be Laggards with regard to certain new ideas that we consider ill-advised or over-sold. For many true Laggards, the issue is much more personal: these are men and women who were innovators themselves many years ago and were unsuccessful or burned-out with regard to this innovation. They advocated a major reform, but never saw this reform enacted. They championed the use of a major new technology, only to see their colleagues casually dismiss this technology as a gimmick. They devoted many hours to design of a new program that was thrown out only four years after being installed in their institution. If a new professional practice such as coaching is successful than what does this say about the Laggard’s own past failure(s) as an innovator? If nothing else, an important lesson can be learned from the passionate objections voiced by Laggards: when we isolate or dismiss an innovator, then we not only lose this person’s ideas and potential leadership. We also create a Laggard who can be a persistent enemy of innovation for many years to come.
So what should we do about those Laggards who oppose an innovation for these very personal (and usually undisclosed) reasons? We can try to isolate them, but this is rarely effective. Alternatively, we can bring in Laggards as historian and advisor: “What can we learn from you about what happened many years ago? What can you teach us? If you were to plan for the successful enactment of this program to improve professional practices what would you do?” Yes, this is a co-option strategy. Laggards will see right through it if this request isn’t legitimate and if one doesn’t seriously consider the advice they offer and listen patiently to the stories they wish to convey. There are certain repeated patterns (fractals) that are found in most institutions. We can identify these patterns with the assistance of our colleagues, who happen to be Laggards, and can effectively leverage these patterns to our advantage and to the advantage of our institution.
COMBINING STRATEGIES
Is it possible to entertain the notion that humans are rational, social creatures who want to solve their hidden problems but also want to protect and enhance their vested interests? If we make such an assumption, we must combine our strategies for change—as did Jack Lindquist (1978) in Strategies for Change. Rational research and planning is not enough—nor is connecting innovations to opinion leaders in all the right ways. Nor is skilled intervention to diagnose human needs and to reduce resistance—nor is the most effective political maneuvering. We must do it all.
Planned change starts with a “felt need” on the potential user’s part, on the part of the person, group or organization which might change. Something is wrong; something needs improvement. A diagnosis is conducted and a problem statement emerges. Then there is a search and retrieval of alternate solutions both inside and outside the user system. Some solution for the local situation then is developed and approved. Application follows. Often this implementation raises another need which starts the cycle all over again.
In essence, all effective change projects involve a basic act of communication—an interactive process, with all parties involved as sources and receivers of change messages and with all focused on solving the receiver’s problem. In such a model, all of the problem-solvers (including those that are external to the organization) would employ rational planning, the R&D model, probably with the help of experts in research or development. All would exchange messages through social networks, perhaps with the assistance of skilled linking agents. All parties would confront and resolve human barriers to change, and an applied behavioral science interventionist could be of valuable assistance there. All parties would use, or run against, power and authority, and a political strategist would come in handy.
SUMMARY
What brings about changes in attitudes and behaviors? Some believe that humans are essentially rational, so reason and evidence should do the trick. Intentional change, therefore, takes the form of a rational sequence of activities to produce a change message based in theory and research, then developed and tested empirically and logically and finally accepted because of its sound evidence and reason. Research and Development centers, institutional research and planning offices and formal governance systems are designed to operate as if change is mainly a rational process. At the heart of any evidence-based initiative in coaching (or any other field) is this assumption about rationality. Highly effective coaches know this.
Others find that humans are social creatures. New attitudes and behaviors, though they may be developed by rational processes, raise awareness, interest, trial and eventual adoption through a process of social interaction and persuasion in which opinion leaders and reference groups are influences perhaps as significant as the rational soundness of the change message itself. Intentional change under these assumptions puts time and skill into linking innovative ideas, practices or products to “potential adopters” through social networks. Professional associations, information clearinghouses, learning resources centers, conferences, workshops and extension agencies use this strategy. Furthermore, social interaction resides at the heart of the professional coaching enterprise itself. Highly successful coaches know this.
Still others feel that the main obstacles to change are not impressive messages nor social influences. Psychological barriers are the problem. What is needed is the skilled intervention of human relations consultation in order to diagnose and facilitate the reduction of those barriers. Yet another group maintains we are political animals at base, busy protecting and strengthening our vested interests. In order to accomplish change, we need to build powerful coalitions among interests and obtain authoritative decisions which will be enforced by requiring people to change their attitudes and behaviors. That strategy is visible in the informal governance process and in administrative policies regarding program and personnel priorities. Professional coaches who are able to sustain their practice for many years know this—and many failed coaches are naïve about these political processes.
All of these assumptions hold true, probably in varying degrees depending on the issue, the situation and the people involved. It would seem that one of the most important roles to be played by a professional coach is to help her client appreciate the value inherent in each of these change strategies and find a way to effectively implement and interweave these strategies on behalf of her organization and those being served by her organization. Similarly, one of the major challenges facing the field of coaching is to move beyond a simplistic, rationalistic approach to the use of evidence, and instead embrace and engage a much more complex, nuanced and multi-strategy approach—such as we have advanced in this essay.
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References
Ariely, Dan (2008) Predictably Irrational. New York: Harper.
Bledstein, Burton (1976) The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and Development of Higher Education in America. New York: Norton.
Brock, Vikki (2014) Sourcebook of Coaching History: Second Edition. ISBN: 1469986655.
Freedman, Thomas (2007) The World is Flat 3.0. New York: Picador/MacMillan.
Friedman, Thomas (2008) Hot, flat, and crowded. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Gladwell, Malcolm (2000) The tipping point. Boston: Little,Brown.
Havelock, Ronald G. and Others (1971) Planning for Innovation through the Dissemination and Utilization of Scientific Knowledge. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research.
Kuhlenschmidt, Sally (2010) Issues in Technology and Faculty Development, Kay Gillespie and Douglas Robertson (Ed.) Guide to faculty development. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Lindquist, Jack (1978) Strategies for Change. Washington D.C.: Council of Independent Colleges.
Parsons, Talcott and Platt, Gerald (1973) The American University. Cambridge, CA: Harvard University Press.
Rogers, Everett. (2003) Diffusion of innovation (5th ed.). New York: Free Press.
Sarason, Seymour (1972) The Creation of Settings and Future Societies. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Smick, David (2008) The World is Curved: Hidden Dangers to the Global Economy. New York: Penguin.