If we replay “boy” with “person” and replace “ball” with “Fact”, then the issue becomes a bit more in doubt. “This person distorted the Facts” is not quite the same thing as “A distortion of Facts was exhibited by this person”. This second statement doesn’t differ much from “a distortion of facts seems to be prevalent in this person.” These left branching statements seem to place some causality in the state of distorted Facts: is this person becoming ‘untrustworthy’ because of the distortion—or is the distortion a symptom of the Black person’s inherent untrustworthiness (and potential instability)?
On the surface, these variations in the presentation of a description seem trivial; however, we would suggest that they are not and that any thoughtful review of contemporary theories about and strategies for reflecting on Facts (and expertise) must address the often-subtle issue of implicit (as well as explicit) causality. A sequencing of causality is critical in seeking to understand and address the challenge of judging and interpreting Facts.
While semantics plays an important role in our assigning a value of specific Facts, syntax (or at least the fundamental ordering of causality) plays a role in the formulation of assumptions about the reasons why specific Facts are being offered (and why they are to be believed or dismissed). The matter of semantics and syntax might be subtle and even elusive—however, Facts and the words being used to convey facts are powerful precisely because of the rather pernicious way in which our reality is impacted by the use and sequencing of these words (note the branching of this sentence and our focus on “Facts” and “words”).
Espoused Theory vs. Theory in Use
We offer a second way in which to view the nature and course of a social construction—that we can apply in our analysis of the short life of facts. This second view comes from the work of two psychologists, Chris Argyris and Don Schon (1974). During more than twenty years of remarkable collaborative work, Argyris and Schon provided a detailed analysis of the way in which we, as leaders, members of a work group, or someone assessing the validity of an expert’s opinions, operate with two distinctive theories about human behavior and particularly about our own behavior. On the one hand, we have an Espoused Theory. This is the theory we offer to other people when asked why we do what we do:
“Why do I confront this person who works for me by offering examples of his misconduct? I do this because, he needs to know what he is doing in order to improve his performance.”
“As a leader, it is important for me to treat all of my employees in a fair and equitable manner. That is the modern way to be a leader.”
Our espoused theories often come from the books or articles we have read, the training session we attended last week (if we can still remember what was contained on the power points)—or the opinion offered by an “expert”. At some level, we even believe that we operate in a manner that is aligned with this theory—though we are usually aware that there are “exceptions” – such as when my subordinate has ignored my previous feedback, or when the organization I lead is “in crisis.”
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