We would offer the example of differentiations made by the Ancient Greeks in the domain of what we in contemporary life would call “love.” Most of us use the single word, “love,” whereas the Greeks identified four different kinds of committed engagements: eros, philia, storge and agape. The Whorfians would suggest that Ancient Greeks might have placed greater value on the domain of “love” than is the case with those of us who place greater value on and attend much more diligently to other matters. A similar case could be made for the Inuit, skiers and snowboarders. The critical point to be made here is that this version of the Whorfian hypothesis is called “weak” because correlations do not imply causation – only mutual alignment.
Some Whorfians and renegade linguistics and psychologists move beyond this weak approach to understanding the interplay between words and thought. The Strong Whorf Hypothesis is based on the assertion that our language (and specifically our words) strongly influences and even determines our perceptions of and actions in the world. The strong question becomes: do the Inuit and skiers see something different and take different actions as a result of their more detailed distinctions regarding “snow”? Did the Greeks see something different in their loving relationships with one another? Were there differing perceptions that led to differing decisions and actions as a result of the words being used?
Clearly, this pull between a weak and strong Whorfian perspective is important when we turn to the use of words to understand and classify the seemingly elusive phenomenon called “Fact.” Semantics play a critical role in the assignment of labels to particular types of Fact. Specifically, we seek to distinguish between different kind of Facts regarding their validity and use. Is our concern about and “valuing” of Facts reflected in the extent to which we use differing words related to the general domain in which Facts reside?
For instance, Milton Rokeach (1976) devotes an entire book to the differentiation of beliefs, attitudes and values. We can toss in other related words—such as opinions, biases, perspectives, viewpoints, contention, stance and position. As in the case of snow and love, the fine differentiation between different ways in which “Facts” are treated suggests that this is an important matter for someone like Rokeach who makes their living by studying the way in which people treat the Facts they are presented with in their life.
What about the rest of us? We propose that there is often a lumping of everything about Facts into one or two words. We say that someone has got “strong opinions” or is “stubborn. We might instead assign a label that is more judgmental and even accusatory: we say that they are “racists” or “socialists” or “Nazis.” If we don’t like what they have said. Alternatively, we label them as “patriots”, ”thoughtful” or “caring.” At an even more fundamental level we say that they are “wrong” or “evil.” (or they are “right” and “ethical”).
The Whorfians would suggest that most of don’t particularly value or are interested in the way other people handle Facts. This might be the case. However, we would like to contribute a bit to the Whorfian theory by suggesting that differentiation might also at times have to do with the level of emotions invested in the domain in which the differentiation takes place. Under conditions of intense emotionality, we are likely to find regression in all levels of cognitive processes—including the thoughtful use of words. We are fearful, angry or disgusted and simply declare that this person we have encountered is simply a “racist” or “communist”. It doesn’t really matter to us if this person is taking a political stance, positioning themselves for a particular plan of action, or viewing this situation from a particular perspective related to their cultural background.
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