The social construction of numbers doesn’t stop here. I would suggest that even Stone’s second mental move (counting) can be somewhat arbitrary, especially if the number of entities to be counted are quite large. We often are required to “sample” the population to be measured, since there is not enough time or resources to count all entities. We speak of statistical probabilities, rather than statistical certainties. We estimate the extent to which we are likely to be correct in our portrayal of the entire population—often accepting 95% probability as acceptable. Why not 90% or 99%. It is arbitrary and a social convention (reinforced by norms, textbooks references and publication requirements). In the world described by Thomas Kuhn (1962), there are existing paradigmatic communities that determine what an adequate sample is and how this sample should be conducted.
Deborah Stone (2021, p. 50) put it this way:
The more you go along with the crowd, the more influence you have on the final score. It’s a paradoxical power, though, for if you think the same way as the crowd, the crowd probably has had more influence on you than you will have on its conclusions. Because scientists define reliability as counting the same way other trained scientists count, conformity becomes the standard of correctness. To invoke one of my mother’s mantras, “Just because everybody does it, doesn’t make it right.” The method produces a kind of groupthink, albeit with experts instead of average Joes.
Paradigmatic conformity and going along with the crowd (paradigmatic community) is fully in place among members of the scientific community (and culture) (and among those operating in the humanities—though Kuhn would suggest that these communities are not organized enough (and are not conforming enough) to be called “paradigmatic.” He calls them “pre-paradigmatic.”
Finally, I would point to yet another way in which numbers and measurements are social constructions that often appear to be arbitrary. This final condition relates to something called “primacy” by those psychologists (and behavioral economists) who study judgements and decision-making processes. It seems that the first numbers being presented, and the first conclusions reported on the basis of these numbers, tends to hold “primacy.” They are much more influential than number presented at a later time or than a correction in the initial report of the numbers. This is a point, once again, when the distinctions drawn between Snow’s two cultures breaks down. The first presentation (and description) of the principal character in a novel or movie will define the nature and motives of this person throughout the narrative.
Stone (2021, pp. 20-21) mentions Goffman’s (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life as a way to describe the motivates we have for reporting on our pain (or answering questionnaires). The reports of pain are best conveyed by means of words rather than numbers (though pain scales are usually numerical). Questionnaire results must always be tempered by recognition that respondents usually want to appear in their responses to be rational, caring, observant, consistent, etc. I would suggest, even more broadly, that we are deeply concerned at all times in our life with the initial impression that other people have of us and that any attempt to convey something about how we feel, think and behave are based at least in part on these initial conditions. We are always in the business of socially constructing our own presentation of self. It all eventually comes down to narrative—and social behavior must ultimately look to the humanities for wisdom (with some humble assistance from the behavioral sciences).
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